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EXTENT TO WHICH THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND
STATUTES ARE IN EFFECT
JAMES W. DAY

Section 2.01 of FloridaStatutes 1949, which was enacted on November 6, 1829,1 reads as follows:

"The common and statute laws of England which are of a
general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter
mentioned, down to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared
to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the
United States and the acts of the legislature of this state."
Various meanings are attached to the term "common law," and
often the sense in which it is employed in a particular instance is determinable only from the context in which it stands. It is sometimes
used in American decisions and elsewhere as including English statutes
that modify the English common law. Thus American statutes that
adopt the English common law without mention of English statutes are
construed in some jurisdictions as adopting also those statutes in force
in England on the date as of which the common law was adopted by
the jurisdiction in question. 2 Since, however, the Florida statute expressly adopts both the English common law and the English statutes
as they existed on July 4, 1776, it is evident that the Legislature of
Florida is here using the term "common law" as it was employed by
Blackstone, 3 namely, as consisting of the lex non scripta or that portion
of the law that derives its force from custom and immemorial usage
and not from statutory enactment. Cases in which the decisions are
based on custom and usage are evidence of that custom and usage
and constitute the chief repository of the common or non-statutory law.
In American jurisdictions that have adopted the English common law
as it existed on a specified date, the English cases prior to that date
are usually accepted as conclusive evidence of what the common law
Terr. Acts 1829, p. 8.
1Fla.
2

E.g., Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679 (1937);

see Browning v. Browning's Estate, 3 N.M. 371, 886, 9 Pac. 677, 684 (1886). But
cf., e.g., Boardman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. 149 (1849); Farmers' and Merchants' Ins.
Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 78 N.W. 1054 (1899).
*63.
31 BL. COMMI.

(803)
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was at the time they were decided. 4 A few early treatises such as those
of Littleton. Coke, and Blackstone are regarded as possessing almost
equal evidentiary value in this connection.'
PATrERNS FoLLoWD IN THE ADoPTIoN OF THE ComoN

LAW

In most of the states of the Union, the English common law as of a
particular date or the English common law and statutes of such a date
have been adopted. In many of them this adoption has been by statute
or constitutional provision. In others it has been made by the courts
without the aid of statutory enactment, on the theory that the English
law that was in effect in the colonies prior to the American Revolution
continued in force thereafter. In Louisiana, however, neither the
English common law nor the English statutes have been adopted. 6
In a majority of the states, including Florida, both the statutes and
common law that were in effect in England on a specified date have
been adopted. In some states, however, it has been held that only the
English common law of the date in question, unaffected by English
statutes, is in effect. These decisions are based in some of these states
on an interpretation of the English-law-adopting provision of the constitution, or the statutes of the state, as excluding the English statutes.7
In others the decisions are based on the theory that the courts in
recognizing the English law as the basis of the jurisprudence of the
state, without the aid of an adopting statute, have excluded the English
8
statutes.
In some states, including Florida, the common law or the common
law and statutes that were in effect in England on July 4, 1776, have
been adopted; 9 in others the date selected in this connection is the
fourth year of the reign of James the First.10 That date was chosen
4

E.g., Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909).
Welch v. People, 30 Il1. App. 399 (1889); see Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
6Cf. Noel Bros. v. Texas & P. Ry., 16 La. App. 622, 138 So. 830 (1931).
7
E.g., Boardman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. 149 (1849); Farmers' & Merchants' Ins.
Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 78 N.W. 1054 (1899); Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10
(1868); Courand v. Vollmer, 31 Tex. 397 (1868).
8
Cf., e.g., Lamphere's Case, 61 Mich. 105, 27 N.W. 882 (1886).
9
See, e.g., Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69, 74 (1876); State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29
R.I. 254, 261, 70 Atl. 1, 4 (1908).
' 0 E.g., Haggin v. International Trust Co., 69 Colo. 135, 169 Pac. 138 (1917);
Sopher v. State, 169 Ind. 177, 81 N.E. 913 (1907); Commonwealth v. Donoghue,
250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (1983); State v. Beck, 337 Mo. 839, 85 S.W.2d 1026
5
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because it corresponds roughly with the time of the establishment of
the first permanent English settlement in America at Jamestown in
1607.11 In a few states dates other than those mentioned have been
designated concerning this matter. Thus in Georgia the common law
in effect prior to May 14, 1776, has been adopted; 1 2 and in Tennessee
the English common law as it stood in 1775 is in effect. 13
This pattern of adopting the English common law or- the English
common law and statutes of a particular date, however, has not been
followed in all states. In South Carolina the colonial assembly by a
statute enacted on December 12, 1712, adopted 167 specific English
statutes and such part of the common law as was not altered by those
statutes. 14 It has usually been held that an English statute omitted from
that enumeration is not in effect in South Carolina. Among the omissions, for example, was the Statute De Donis.. 5 By the terms of that
statute a limitation to a grantee and the heirs of his body, which prior
to the enactment of that statute in 1285 had created a fee simple conditional, was given effect when used thereafter as an estate in fee tail.
As a result of this omission, a limitation of the type in question creates
in South Carolina today an estate in fee simple conditional,' 6 although
it has been impossible to create such an estate in England since 1285.
I-isTOIcAL BACKGROUND IN FLORDA

It is interesting to note, although it is indeed rare that the matter
is of practical importance today, that the position of Florida as to the
basic English law in effect has not always been the same as at present.
During the years of Spanish rule, the Spanish law was of course the
foundation of the legal system existing in the area. This circumstance
has left no imprint on the present law, however, aside from the fact
that certain acts of the Territory of Florida, some of which are included
in the current revision,' 7 preserve rights and interests obtained by
(1935); see Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603, 613 (1854).
"See,

e.g., Penny v. Little, 4 Ill. 301, 304 (1841).

12See Harris v. Powers, 129 Ga. 74, 79, 58 S.E. 1038, 1040 (1907).
13 See Porter v. State, Mart. & Y. 226, 227 (Tenn. 1827).

141 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §63 (1949); see State v. Charleston Bridge Co.,
113 S.C. 116, 126, 101 S.E. 657, 660 (1919).
1513 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285).
26E.g., Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1851).
17E.g., FLA. STAT. §2.02 (1949) (based on Proclamation of Major General
Andrew Jackson on July 17, 1821, Fla. Terr. Acts 1822, p. xiv; Ordinance of
Jackson of July 21, 1821, §, Fla. Terr. Acts 1822, p. xx; Act of Sept. 2, 1822, §4,
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individuals while the Spanish law was in effect.
Spain ceded Florida to the United States by a treaty dated February
22, 1819, and ratified February 19, 1821.
Governor Andrew Jackson by his proclamation dated July 17, 1821,
declared that all laws and municipal regulations that were in existence
when Florida was ceded to the United States should remain in effect
until other provision should be made.
The Act of September 2, 1822, of the Legislative Council" read:
"... the common law of England which is of a general nature,
and all statutes of the British Parliament in aid of, or to supply
the defects of the said common law, made prior to the fourth year
of James the First, and of a general nature, and not local to the
kingdom, which said common law and statutes are not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, and
except as in this Act is hereby excepted, together with the system
of equity recognized and practiced in the courts of chancery in
the United States, shall be the rule of decision in this territory,
until repealed by the Legislature thereof - Provided, however,
that none of the British statutes respecting crimes and punishment shall be in force in this Territory, nor shall any person be
punished by the common law, where the laws and statutes of this
territory have made provision on the subject, but where the laws
and statutes of the United States and of this Territory have not
made provision for the punishment of offences, the several courts
may proceed to punish for such offences - Provided the punishment shall in no case be other than fine and imprisonment, and
the term of imprisonment shall not exceed twelve months, and
the fine shall not exceed five hundred dollars ...
"... this act shall have effect in West Florida, from and after
its passage, and in East Florida, on the first day of October, in
the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two."
The quoted portion of the above act remained in force until the
taking effect of the Act of June 29, 1823,19 which contained the following provision:
Fla. Terr. Acts 1822, p. 50; and Act of Nov. 6, 1829, Fla. Terr. Acts 1829, p. 8);
id., §694.01 (based on Act of June 24, 1823, Fla. Terr. Acts 1823, p. 26); cf. id.,
§708.01 (based on Act of Dec. 23, 1824, Fla. Terr. Acts 1824, p. 189).
"SFla. Terr. Acts 1822, p. 50.
1'FIa. Terr. Acts 1823, p. 111.
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".... the common and statute law of England which is of a
general and not a local nature with the exceptions hereinafter
mentioned down to the fourth day of July one thousand seven
hundred and seventy-six, be and the same is hereby declared to
be of force in this Territory; provided, the said common and
statute law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the United States and the acts of the Legislative Council of this
Territory - and provided also, that none of the British statutes
respecting crimes and misdemeanors, shall be in force in this
territory; nor shall any person be punished by the said common
law, when the statutes of this territory have made provision on
the subject; but where the said statutes have not made provision
for the punishment of any offence, the several courts of this
Territory shall proceed to punish such offence by fine and imprisonment; provided, That in no case the fine shall exceed five
hundred dollars, or the imprisonment twelve months."
This Act of June 29, 1823, was repealed as of January 1, 1829, by
the Act of November 23, 1828,20 which was entitled "An Act to Provide
for the Condensation of the Laws." The latter act listed and continued
in effect eighty-two of the previously enacted territorial statutes and
repealed all other public acts that had been passed in prior sessions of
the Legislative Council. Neither the Act of September 2, 1822, nor
that of June 29, 1828, was among those that were retained; and from
January 1, 1829, to November 6, 1829, no statute with reference to the
English common law and statutes was in effect.
The Act of November 6, 1829,21 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Adoption of the Common and Statute Laws of England, and for
Repealing Certain Laws and Ordinances," read as follows:
".... the common and statute laws of England, which are of a
general and not of a local nature, with the exception hereinafter
mentioned down to the fourth day of July, one thousand seven
hundred and seventy-six, be, and the same are hereby declared
to be of force in this Territory: Provided, the said statutes and
common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the United States, and the acts of the Legislative Council of this
Territory; And provided also, That none of the British statutes
20
Fla.
21

Terr. Acts 1828, p. 203.
Fla. Terr. Acts 1829, p. 8.
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respecting crimes and misdemeanors, shall be in force in this
territory, except statutes declaratory of and in aid of the common
law; nor shall any person be punished by the said common law,
when there is an existing provision by the statutes of this Territory on the subject; but when there exists no such provision by
the statute of the Territory, then the several courts of this Territory shall proceed to punish such offence by fine and imprisonment; Provided, That in no case, the fine shall exceed five
hundred dollars, or the imprisonment, twelve months."
The portions of this act dealing with matters other than crimes and
misdemeanors have remained in continuous operation since its enactment and are now embodied without change in substance in Section
2.01 of FloridaStatutes 1949, which is set out at the beginning of this
article. The provisions in the Act of November 6, 1829, concerning
crimes and misdemeanors were amended by the Act of February 10,
1832,22 and as so modified are included in Sections 775.01 and 775.02
of the current statutes.
ENGLISH STATUTES IN EFFECT IN FLORIDA

The Legislature can of course repeal either expressly or by implication an English statute theretofore in effect in the state, just as it can
repeal one of its own prior enactments.
The bar and the courts of Florida were long hampered by the
relative inaccessibility of copies of the English statutes in effect in the
state. Preliminary steps to remedy the situation were taken with the
enactment of the Act of December 27, 1845,23 which authorized the
compilation and publication of the English statutes in force in the
state. Pursuant to this authorization, Judge Leslie A. Thompson compiled in manuscript form the English statutes that in his opinion were
of practical significance in Florida in 1847, the date of the completion
of his project. He appended comments and notes to many of the
statutes. Unfortunately the publication of his materials, although
authorized by the Act of 1845, was delayed for almost a century.
Mr. Guy W. Botts, now of the Jacksonville bar, while a student in
the University of Florida College of Law, completed a research project
in 1987 that involved the annotating of Judge Thompson's manuscript
with notes on all Florida decisions pertaining to the English statutes.
22
23

FIa. Terr. Acts 1832, p. 63.
FIa. Laws 1845, c. 46.
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At the request of the Attorney General of Florida, Mr. Botts in 1941
began a more complete annotation of the Thompson materials. In this
work he retained such portions of Judge Thompson's notes as in his
opinion were still of value, and added extensive comments of his own.
He indicated the numerous English statutes that were in effect at the
time of the original compilation but that had been repealed by the
subsequent enactment of Florida statutes dealing with the same or
similar subject matter. His materials were published in 1948 in Volume
3 of Florida Statutes 1941, pages 5 to 79.24
The contributions of Judge Thompson and Mr. Botts in this connection are scholarly works that are of great value to the bar. It should
be noted, however, that the question as to what English statutes are m
effect is controlled by the English-law-adopting statute of Florida, and
that the Thompson and Botts treatises merely represent the respective
conclusions of the authors as to which English statutes continue to be
within the scope of that statute. As Mr. Botts states in his preface, this
determination is in the case of some English statutes a difficult one to
make. It is quite possible for unusual situations to arise that are
controlled by English statutes that are omitted from the lists in
question.
All of the English statutes enacted prior to the American Revolution
are included in Ruffhead's Statutes at Large, the first volume of which
was published in London in 1769.25
PESmENT APPLicABrTY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAw AND STATuTEs

English Statutes. Section 2.01 of Florida Statutes 1949 adopts only
such portions of the English common law and statutes in effect on
July 4, 1776, as are of a general nature. It expressly excludes those
24

The annotations to Section 2.01 in the Pocket Supplement of Florida Statutes
Annotated list the English statutes included in the Thompson manusenpt but do
not set out the statutes themselves.
2An English statute is most frequently designated and cited by the regnal
year of the sovereign that corresponds to the date of its enactment. Thus the
Statute of Tenures is referred to as the Statute of 12 Charles the Second, chapter
24. It is a simple matter to ascertain whether an English statute designated in this
manner was enacted sufficiently early to render possible its being in effect in
Florida. George the Third ascended the throne on October 25, 1760. No English
statute enacted after July 4, 1776, which was in the fifteenth year of his reign, or
bearing the name of any of the British monarchs subsequent to him - George the
Fourth, William the Fourth, Victoria, Edward the Seventh, George the Fifth,
Edward the Eighth, and George the Sixth - can be in effect in Florida.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss3/2
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portions that are local in character. Even in the absence of an express
exclusion of local English common law and statutes in the Englishlaw-adopting statute of a jurisdiction, it is held that only the English
law that is of general application and not that which is local to
England is in effect. 26 As was stated by the Justices of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in their report made to the legislature of the
state in 1808 under statutory mandate, there are included within this
exception "a multitude of English statutes, relating to the king's prerogative, the rights and privileges of the nobility and clergy, the local
commerce and revenue of England, and other subjects unnecessary to
enumerate." 27 Similarly, the so-called Black Act 28 for the suppression
of poaching was held not to be in effect in Georgia, since it was
"founded upon a tender solicitude for the amusement and property of
29
the aristocracy of England."
Common-Law Doctrines. Principles of the common law that were
developed to achieve objectives similar to those of the statutes just
mentioned are frequently regarded as local to England and as therefore not of force in the United States. In Bates v. Brown,30 for example,
it was held that although the common law rule of shifting inheritances
had not been rejected by statute in Illinois, it was not in effect there. 3'
By that rule one who inherits from a decedent is divested of his estate
by the birth even at a time beyond the period of gestation following
the death of the decedent, of an individual who would have inherited
32
the estate if he had been in being at the death of the decedent. It
was stated in the Bates case that this rule sought to promote the
retention of landed property in the hands of a few in order to conserve the splendor of the nobility and the influence of the leading
families, and that consequently it was local to England. The decisions
of the various jurisdictions are not uniform, however, with reference to
whether common law doctrines will be rejected on grounds such as
these. It has been held, for example, that the rule of shifting inherit26

See, e.g., City of Lincoln v. Rickets, 84 F.2d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1936).
Binn. 593, 596 (Pa. 1808); cf. Dale, Adoption of the Common Law, 21

273

Am. L. REc. (N.s.) 553, 567.

I, c. 22 (1722).
State v. Campbell, T.U.P. Charlt. 166, 167 (Ga. 1808).
305 Wall. 710 (U.S. 1866).
3t
Accord, Drake v. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21 (1861); Cox v. Matthews, 17 Ind.
289 GEO.

29

367 (1861).
322

BL. COMM. '208, n.9.
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ance is in effect in North Carolina. 33
A similar justification that is sometimes advanced for the rejection
of common law doctrines of the kind under consideration is that the
reason on which the rule was based had ceased to exist before the
jurisdiction in question adopted the common law. Thus, although
estates in joint tenancy,3 4 and estates by the entirety,35 with their
accompanying right of survivorship to the longer lived of the coowners, are recognized in most jurisdictions as existing in the absence
of statutory change of the common law, it has been held that no such
survivorship exists in Ohio. 30 The Ohio court stated in effect that
survivorship was applied to these estates at common law for the convenience of the lord under whom the land was held in tenure, since the
necessity for his looking both to the heir of a deceased co-owner and
to the survivor for the enforcement of his tenurial rights was thereby
eliminated; 37 that these tenurial rights of the lord were in the main
abolished by the Statute of Tenures; 38 and that the reason for recogjoint tenancy and estates by the
nizing survivorship in estates in 39
entirety therefore no longer exists.
It is of course true that the reason supporting the recognition of
survivorship in joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety has ceased
to exist as completely in those states that continue to accord that
recognition as it has in Ohio. The divergent holdings with respect to
this question exemplify the fact that the various jurisdictions are not
consistent with one another in the application of the maxim that a
rule of the common law passes away when the reason on which it is
based ceases to exist. Furthermore, decisions of a single jurisdiction
often are inconsistent in that they apply the maxim to some40 rules and
reject it in the case of others to which it is equally relevant.
33

Caldwel v. Black, 5 Ired. L. 463 (N.C. 1845).
E.g., Gaunt v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 542, 89 N.E. 812 (1909); 2

34

TIFFANY, REAL

PRoPERTY §419 (3d ed. 1939).
35
E.g., Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); Palmer
v. Mansfield, 222 Mass. 263, 110 N.E. 283 (1915); 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra

note 34, §430.
36Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1826).

37Cf. Fisher v. Wigg, 1 Wins. 14, 21, 24 Eng. Rep. 275, 278 (K.B. 1700).
3812 CArt. II, c. 24 (1660).
30
Cf. Gaines v. Lessee of Grant, 5 Binn. 119, 123 (Pa. 1812); Haws v. Haws,
3 Atk. 525, 26 Eng. Rep. 1102, 1103 (Ch. 1747).
40
The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, in Farringtonv. Greer, 94 Fla.

457, 113 So. 722 (1927), and Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853, 7 So. 391 (1889),
recognized the common law rule that a conveyance to a grantee by one whose land

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss3/2
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Even some portions of the common law of general application that
have not been repealed by local statute may not be in effect. Thus
common law doctrines are not in effect in a state when they are
incompatible with its views as to liberty and sovereignty, 4 1 are inconsistent with its customs and institutions, 42 or are not suited to its
physical and climatic conditions.4 3 Similarly, common law doctrines
that were modified in a state by custom during the time that it was a
colony are of force in it only as so modified and not in their original
44
form.
Stare Decisis. When it has been settled by judicial decision that a
principle of law is in effect in a jurisdiction, the courts of the jurisdiction of course usually continue thereafter to recognize that principle
as of force.4 5 And even though the principle has not been applied
there, the courts often regard it as binding upon them in an appropriate
is in the adverse possession of a third person, is void against the adverse possessor
and gives the grantee no right of entry upon which he can maintain an action in
his own name. This rule has been rejected by judicial decision in a number of
states on the ground that the reason that supported it is no longer operative. Cf. 5
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1331 (8d.ed. 1939). But in Richardson v. Holman, 160
Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 611 (1948), the Court rejected the allied doctrine of the common
law that a possibility of reverter is inalienable and apparently based its holding on
the ground, among others, that the conditions that gave rise to the doctrine no
longer exist.
41See State v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N.W. 830, 841 (1922).
42
Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1 (1877) (holding use of spring guns to protect
property from trespass, even if sanctioned at common law, to be inconsistent with
customs of Alabama); cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(holding common law rule restricting freedom of the press, to immunity from
censorship before publication to be inconsistent with American customs).
43
San Joaquin & K. R. C. & I. Co. v. Fresno F. & I. Co., 158 Cal. 626, 112
Pac. 182 (1910) (holding common law rules as to use of water in streams, not
applicable to California); Reno S. M. & R. Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 21
Pac. 317 (1889) (holding common law doctrine of riparian rights not to be suited
to physical conditions in Nevada); Champlain & St. L. R.R. v. Valentine, 19 Barb.
484 (N.Y. 1853) (holding common law doctrine of riparian rights as developed in
England where no large lakes exist, to be inapplicable to large lakes in New York);
Fulmer v. Williams, 122 Pa. 191, 15 Ad. 726 (1888) (holding common law
concept that the term "navigable rivers" includes only tidal streams, to be inapplicable in Pennsylvania, where, contrary to the situation prevailing in England,
most important rivers are chiefly above tidal waters).
44
Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810); see Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257
Mass. 172, 179, 153 N.E. 537, 540 (1926).
45
E.g., In re Seaton's Estate, 154 Fla. 446, 18 So.2d 20 (1944); Stinson v.
Meegan, 318 Mass. 459, 62 N.E.2d 118 (1945).
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situation if the rule is established in the common law of England and
is recognized by other American jurisdictions. 40 Thus the High Court
of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi in holding that the Rule in
was then in effect in that state, made the following
Shelley's Case
47
statement:
"The argument has frequently been urged by those who assign
a feudal origin to the rule that inasmuch as the . . .system has

been abolished the reason for the rule has ceased, and therefore
the rule itself should be abrogated. However cogent this argument may be when addressed to the legislature, yet courts of
justice cannot so far recognize its policy as to make it the basis
of their decisions. Whenever a principle of the common law has
been once clearly.., established, the courts of this country must
enforce it until repealed by the legislature, as long as there is a
subject matter for the principle to operate on, and although the
reason in the opinion of the court which induced its original
establishment may have ceased to exist. ...Were it otherwise the

rules of law would be as fluctuating and unsettled as the opinions
of the different judges administering them might happen to differ
in relation to the existence of sufficient and valid reasons for
maintaining and upholding them."
Illustrative of an opposing view that is often taken is the following
language used by the Supreme Court of the United States with reference to the applicability in the federal courts of the rule of the common
to testify in behalf of the other in
law that one spouse is incompetent
48
a criminal prosecution:

"It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the
old rule, however contrary to modem experience and thought,
and however opposed, in principle, to the general current of
legislation and of judicial opinion it may have become, leaving to
Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of course, Congress
has that power; but if Congress fails to act,... is it not the duty

of the court, if it possesses the power, to decide it in accordance
with the present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than
46E.g., Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 III. 496, 36 N.E. 983 (1894).
47Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 363 (1852).

4sFunk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
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in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the
past? ... That this court ... may decline to enforce the ancient
rule of the common law under conditions as they now exist we
think is not fairly open to doubt ...
"The final question to which we are thus brought is not that
of the power of the federal courts to amend or repeal any given
rule or principle of the common law, for they neither have nor
claim that power, but it is the question of the power of these
courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on
the subject, to declare and effectuate, upon common law principles, what is the present rule upon a given subject in the light
of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to what has
previously been declared and practiced. It has been said so often
as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to
varying conditions."
Stare Decisis in Connection with Principles on the Basis of Which
Transactions May Have Been Conducted. When a rule of law that has
been applied in the decisions of a jurisdiction is one upon which individuals may have relied in their subsequent attempts to acquire
property rights or to provide for the devolution of such rights or in
their commercial transactions, the courts are more reluctant to abrogate it thereafter than in situations in which no proper activities can
have been conducted in reliance upon the law as theretofore recognized. 49 Decisions that establish rules of this type serve not only to
adjudicate the rights of the parties to the immediate controversy but
also to establish principles on the basis of which other individuals
conduct their affairs thereafter. Alterations of such rules can, when
deemed desirable, be made by the legislature, since statutes affect only
subsequent transactions; but when a court vacillates and overrules its
own decisions in these fields, its decision is retrospective and may
impair or destroy interests and titles that have been purchased in
reliance on the supposed stability of the law as previously announced. 0
For the same reason a court is usually hesitant with reference to
rejecting recognized doctrines of the common law in these fields even
49

E.g., Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Loomis, 275 Ky. 445, 121 S.W.2d
947 (1938).
5OSee Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332, 334 (U.S. 1865).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 2

COMMON LAW AND STATUTES IN EFFECT
when it has not previously had occasion to apply them5 ' and although
conditions have so changed since the doctrines had their origin that
if the situation called for their consideration in connection with transactions of a different type, it would hold that they had ceased to
exist.
The rule that the courts will continue to apply the law as theretofore recognized applies with particular force when the title to real
property is involved,5 2 since in most instances of this sort it is especially
probable that interests or estates have been purchased on the faith
of that law.
ATrUDE oF THE FLORIDA CouRT TowARD Tm COMMON LAw

The Supreme Court of Florida has, when changed social or economic conditions suggest that such action is desirable, manifested a
readiness to deviate from principles of the common law other than
those upon which individuals may have relied in entering into proper
transactions. In Banfield v. Addington,53 for example, a married woman
was held to be liable to a customer of her beauty shop for the alleged
negligence of her employee. The Court stated that her exemption at
common law from liability for torts arising out of her attempts to
contract was based on the control over her person, property, services,
and earnings that then was vested in her husband. The Court reasoned
that since social change and modem provisions in the statutes of
Florida have emancipated the wife with respect to her earnings, both
the spirit and soul of the former rule have disappeared and the rule
itself has ceased to exist.
The Florida Court has in the main followed its prior decisions
involving principles on the basis of which individuals may subsequent
to the decisions have acquired title to property 54 or have entered into
commercial transactions. 55 Similarly, it has usually applied to such
situations the common law rules on which individuals may have relied
in acquiring property, even when it has not previously had occasion
to pronounce them. In Ivey v. Peacock,56 for example, the common
5'Cf. Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496, 36 N.E. 983 (1894).
52

E.g., United States v. Title & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924).

Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932).
5 Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Molter v. Johnson, 107 Fla. 47, 144 So. 299 (1932).
55
E.g., Kissimmee v. State ex tel. Ben Hut Life Ass'n, 121 Fla. 151, 163 So.
473 (1935); Alta-Cliff Co. v. Spurway, 113 Fla. 633, 152 So. 731 (1933).
5656 Fla. 440, 47 So. 481 (1908).
53104
4
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law rule that a conveyance can pass no more than a life estate unless
the word "heirs" is used in the granting clause or in the habendum
was applied in 1908 to a conveyance executed in 1887 to a grantee "to
have and to hold . ..in fee simple forever." It was held that the
grantee obtained only a life estate, in spite of the fact that no prior
Florida decision on the point could be found, and although a statute 7
had been enacted in 1903 dispensing with the necessity of using the
word "heirs" in passing a fee simple estate.5s
The Florida Court, however, like those of other jurisdictions, does
not hesitate in a proper situation to overrule its prior decisions or to
abrogate principles of the common law even with reference to the law
of real property, when the rules of law thus repudiated cannot ha, e
been the basis upon which existing estates or interests have been
acquired. Thus the Court in holding in Richardson v. Holman--9 that
a possibility of reverter is now alienable in Florida even if such was
not the case at common law, manifested a willingness to disregard
doctrines of the common law. The decision was based on a statute*'"
that in reality was inapplicable to the facts at hand;';' but the Court
endeavored further to sustain its conclusion by a pattern of reasoning
that would perhaps have led to the same result even in the absence of
the specific statute upon which it relied, and that would require but
little extension to support the rejection of the common law doctrines
with reference to the inalienability of other contingent interests in real
property. The problem as to whether such interests as contingent
remainders and rights of entry for condition broken are alienable in
Florida is consequently unsettled at present.
It is to be observed that no titles or interests in existence at the
time of the decision in question could have come into being through
purchase in reliance upon the common law rule that possibilities of
reverter are inalienable. In instances in which the rejection by the
Court of a common law rule may result in the destruction of such titles
or interests, the rule should not be abrogated otherwise than by
statute.
. 7 Fla. Laws 1903, e.5145.
5'Accord, Jordan v. Landis, 128 Fla. 604, 175 So. 241 (1937); Tyler v. Triesback, 69 Fla. 595, 69 So. 49 (1915)- cf. Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 946
(1927).
,'160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948).
';"'FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1941).
"'Sec 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 309 (1948).
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PECULIAR SIGNIFICANCE OF ME COMMON LAW IN Tm

FIELD

OF REAL PROPERTY

The present legal system is a structure erected upon the foundation
of the common law. The portion of the edifice that pertains to real
property has been even more closely conformed in coloring and lines
to those of this base than has the remainder of the pile, since the need
for stability is relatively greater there and because it is viewed traditionally in a more conservative perspective. While this wing has been
altered occasionally to adapt it to conditions existing at the time, these
modifications have been effected chiefly by renovation and vertical
extension rather than by demolition and replacement. It continues to
manifest, therefore, most of its original form and many of the characteristics of the successive modifications to which it has been subjected.
Consequently, one who would understand the present law of real
property must familiarize himself with the social system introduced
into England at the time of the Norman Conquest and with the rules
of property law to which it gave rise. He must also acquire a knowledge of the various intervening modifications that have been made in
those rules and consider the changing social and economic conditions
in which the modifications had their origin. Some of the old law is
still in effect; and the new law that has been devised consists largely
of additions to and alterations of the old law, that are construed in
the light of the old law.
Although stability and definiteness exist to a greater degree in the
law of real property than in other types of law, it is true nevertheless
that in every jurisdiction many questions as to that law are not settled
by local precedent. The result reached when such questions are litigated is often controlled by whether the court feels on the one hand
that the situation calls for an adherence to the common law or on the
other regards it as one in which it is desirable to deviate from the old
law because of changed conditions or other considerations.
The attorney for a litigant in these instances must understand the
relevant principles of the common law and the reasons upon which
they rest, if he is to contend intelligently for the approach that will
further the interests of his client. The court, also, must relate its
decision to the historical background, regardless of whether the decision is an application or a modification of the original common law,
if it is to avoid a precedent that will introduce confusion into the law
of the jurisdiction. It often first selects the result it deems desirable
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and then applies or rejects on stated grounds the common law, whichever is appropriate, to sustain that result. This practice is satisfactory
when the court considers all of the implications of its holding and
assures itself that it is not achieving justice in the case at hand at the
expense of creating a troublesome precedent that exemplifies the saying
that hard cases make bad law.
Before one uses a decision of one American jurisdiction in another
as an exposition of the common law relevant to a matter in controversy, he must ascertain that neither the concepts of the two jurisdictions as to what constitutes the common law adopted by them nor
their attitudes toward modifying the common law differ to such an
extent as to render the decision inapplicable as a precedent.
For these reasons, the historical development of the law of real
property bulks large in any treatise devoted to that subject.
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